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A network is a graph where the nodes represent players and the links represent
bilateral interaction between the players. A reward game assigns a value to every
network on a fixed set of players. An allocation scheme specifies how to distribute
the worth of every network among the players. This allocation scheme is link
monotonic if extending the network does not decrease the payoff of any player.
We characterize the class of reward games that have a link monotonic allocation
scheme. Two allocation schemes for reward games are studied, the Myerson alloca-
tion scheme and the position allocation scheme, which are both based on allocation
rules for communication situations. We introduce two notions of convexity in the
setting of reward games and with these notions of convexity we characterize the
classes of reward games where the Myerson allocation scheme and the position
allocation scheme are link monotonic. As a by-product we find a characterization
of the Myerson value and the position value on the class of reward games using
potentials.
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Network structures have been used in several contexts to describe the interaction be-
tween economic agents. The place of an agent in a network will affect not only his own
productivity and bargaining position but also the productivities and bargaining positions
of the other players in the network. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provide an overview
of references on networks in a social science context. Subsequently, they study stability
of networks. They describe the economic possibilities of the players depending on the
network structure by a reward function.1 This reward function is then used to study
the relationship between the set of networks that are productively efficient and the set
of networks that are stable, i.e. networks where self-interested agents do not form or
break cooperation. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) show that there exists a conflict be-
tween stability and efficiency of networks. This conflict is further studied by Dutta and
Mutuswami (1997). They study a game in strategic form to describe the formation of a
network. The possible structures in the strategic form game are evaluated by the agents
using an exogenously given allocation rule assigning payoffs to all players. This allo-
cation rule is a straightforward generalization of the Myerson value for communication
situations (see Myerson (1977)).
In this paper we analyze networks from a cooperative point of view. The analysis of
the stability of a network does not only require a specification of payoffs in this network,
but also in all other possible networks between the agents. A scheme specifying the pay-
offs in all networks is called an allocation scheme. We will focus on allocation schemes
where no agent is ever tempted to prevent the formation of additional cooperation be-
tween agents or to break down cooperation between players. These allocation schemes
are in the same spirit as population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games,
introduced by Sprumont (1990), and will be called link monotonic allocation schemes.
As in a population monotonic allocation scheme no player is worse off with additional
cooperation between the players. We will characterize the reward functions for which a
link monotonic allocation scheme exists and additionally study when two specific allo-
cation schemes are link monotonic. The first allocation scheme is based on the Myerson
value. The second allocation scheme will be based on the position value, introduced by
Borm, Owen, and Tijs (1992). As by-products we will characterize the extension of these
allocation rules to the network setting described above using potentials. Additionally,
we will introduce two notions of convexity in the setting of reward games.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries on coop-
1Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) refer to a reward function as a value function.
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erative games and communication situations. In section 3 we describe reward games. In
section 4 we introduce link monotonic allocation schemes, study the relations with pop-
ulation monotonic allocation schemes and provide a characterization of reward games
with a link monotonic allocation scheme. In section 5 we introduce player convex and
link convex reward games. We characterize two allocation rules and characterize the
class of reward games for which the allocation schemes based on these rules are link
monotonic. Finally, section 6 analyzes an example, the symmetric connections model,
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
2 Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v) where N =
{1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players and v is a real-valued function on the family 2N of
all subsets of N with v(∅) = 0. The function v is called the characteristic function of the
cooperative game (N, v). A cooperative game (N, v) is convex if for all S, T ⊆ N with
S ⊆ T and all i ∈ S
v(S)− v(S\{i}) ≤ v(T )− v(T\{i}).
Shapley (1953) showed that every cooperative game (N, v) can be written as a unique
linear combination of unanimity games2 (N, uS)S⊆N , i.e. v =
∑
S⊆N αS(v)uS, where
uS(T ) = 1 if S ⊆ T and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. The coefficients (αS(v))S⊆N are called
unanimity coefficients. If no confusion on the underlying game can arise we will simply







, for all i ∈ N.
A communication situation is a triple (N, v, L) where (N, v) is a TU-game as described
above and (N,L) an undirected graph, i.e. L ⊆ L̄ := {{i, j} | {i, j} ⊆ L, i 6= j} denotes
a set of links. This undirected graph (N,L) partitions the player set into communication
components, where two players are in the same communication component if and only
if they are connected, i.e. there exists a path between the two players using only links
in L. The resulting set of communication components will be denoted by N/L. The
set of links in graph (N,L) within a coalition S ⊆ N will be denoted by L(S), i.e.
L(S) = {{i, j} ∈ L | {i, j} ⊆ S, i 6= j}. The set of components in the graph (S, L(S))
will be denoted by S/L.
2S ⊆ N denotes that S is a subset of N , S ⊂ N denotes that S is a strict subset of N .
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v(C), for all S ⊆ N.
The Myerson value µ (cf. Myerson (1977)) for a communication situation (N, v, L)
coincides with the Shapley value of the graph-restricted game,
µ(N, v, L) := Φ(N, vL).
Hence, if (βS)S⊆N denote the unanimity coefficients of the game (N, vL) then





, for all i ∈ N.
With a slight abuse of notation we denote the set of links in which player i is involved
by Li.3 Furthermore, denote the set of players involved in at least one link by N(L) :=
{i ∈ N | ∃j : {i, j} ∈ L} = {i ∈ N | Li 6= ∅}. For notational convenience we denote
the full cooperation structure on set S by KS = {{i, j} | {i, j} ⊆ S, i 6= j}}. Note that
L̄ = KN .
3 Reward games
In communication situations the profit that can be obtained by the players depends only
on the (connected) components. In order to allow for influence of the internal structure
within a component on the profit the players can obtain we consider reward games.
A pair (N, r), with N the player set and r : 2L → IR a reward function, will be
called a reward game. For every cooperation structure (N,L) with L ⊆ L̄ the value
r(L) represents the profit that can be obtained by all players together if they cooperate
according to this cooperation structure. Throughout this paper we will assume that
r(∅) = 0, which states that no cooperation between the players implies that no profit
can be made.
Note that the reward function of the reward game (N, r) can be seen as the char-
acteristic function of the TU-game (L̄, r). We will refer to this TU-game as the link
game associated with the reward game (N, r). Since every TU-game can be written as a
unique linear combination of unanimity games, the reward function can be written as a





3In fact this set is a function that depends on the set of links L and the player index i.
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Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) concentrate on com-
ponent additive reward functions, i.e. r(L) =
∑
S∈N/L r(L(S)). Although we mainly
concentrate on component additive reward games, we do not restrict ourselves to this
class of reward games. A reward game is monotonic if r(L1) ≤ r(L2) for all L1 ⊆ L2.
A reward communication situation is a triple (N, r, L) where (N, r) is a reward game
and (N,L) an undirected graph. The set of all reward communication situations with
player set N will be denoted by RCSN . The set of all communication situations will
be denoted by RCS. Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) introduced the Myerson value for re-
ward communication situations, a generalization of the Myerson value for communication
situations:





, for all i ∈ N.
Furthermore, they provide a characterization of the Myerson value using component
balancedness and fairness.
The Myerson value for reward communication situations is an example of an allocation
rule for reward communication situations. Such an allocation rule, say γ, assigns a vector
γ(N, r, L) ∈ IRN to every triple (N, r, L). An allocation scheme (xi,L)i∈N,L⊆L̄ for reward
game (N, r) assigns payoffs to all players in all possible networks on the player set.
4 Link monotonic allocation schemes
In this section we will introduce link monotonic allocation schemes. We will relate link
monotonic allocation schemes to population monotonic allocation schemes for cooper-
ative games. Finally, we will characterize the class of reward games that have a link
monotonic allocation scheme.
Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) analyze the formation of a cooperation structure. Given
some allocation rule (e.g. the Myerson value, see section 3) they analyze a link forma-
tion game in strategic form. They conclude that in monotonic reward games the full
cooperation structure will result or a structure that results in the same payoff division
as the full cooperation structure (N, L̄).
Aumann and Myerson (1988) describe a link formation game in extensive form, where
links are formed sequentially. Furthermore, they study a superadditive TU-game where
the full cooperation structure between the players does not result as a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. The full cooperation structure need not form since in their example
the formation of a link can decrease the payoff of several players. If the formation of
a link between two players would not decrease the payoff of any player then the full
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cooperation structure would be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In the following we
will consider reward games and we will concentrate on reward games that have allocation
schemes with the property that the formation of a link between two players would not
decrease the payoff of any player.
Definition 1 A vector (xi,L)i∈N,L⊆L is a link monotonic allocation scheme for the reward
game (N, r) if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) xi,L = 0 for all L ⊆ L, i 6∈ N(L).
(ii)
∑
i∈N xi,L = r(L) for all L ⊆ L.
(iii) xi,L ≤ xi,L∗ for all i ∈ N and L ⊆ L∗ ⊆ L̄.
The first condition makes sure that if a player does not cooperate with any other player
then he receives zero payoff. The second condition states that the value of a network is
divided among the players forming the network (efficiency). The third condition makes
sure that no player ever has a reason to prevent the formation of any link (monotonicity).
The notion of link monotonic allocation scheme is inspired by the notion of population
monotonic allocation scheme (cf. Sprumont (1990)) for cooperative games.
Definition 2 A vector (yi,S)i∈S,S⊆N is a population monotonic allocation scheme for the
cooperative game (N, v) if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i)
∑
i∈S yi,S = v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
(ii) yi,S ≤ yi,T for all i ∈ S and S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
The concepts of population monotonic allocation schemes (in short PMAS) and link
monotonic allocation schemes (in short LMAS) appear to be related. This relation is
made explicit in the following theorem which states that a reward game has a LMAS if
the associated link game has a non-negative PMAS.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N, r) be a reward game. If the associated link game (L, r) has a
non-negative PMAS then (N, r) has a LMAS.
Proof: Let y = (y{i,j},L){i,j}∈L, L⊆L̄ be a non-negative PMAS for (L, r). For all i ∈ N







We show that (xi,L)i∈N,L⊆L is a LMAS for (N, r) by checking the three conditions in
definition 1.
4We define the empty sum to be zero.
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(i) This property follows immediately by noting that
{j ∈ N : {i, j} ∈ L} = ∅ if i 6∈ N(L).

















where the first equality follows by (i) and the last equality by the fact that y is a
PMAS for (L̄, r).

















where the first inequality follows since y is a PMAS for (L̄, r) and the last inequality
follows by the non-negativity of y.
This completes the proof. 2
In the following example we show that the non-negativity assumption is not super-
fluous.
Example 4.1 Consider the reward game ({1, 2}, r) with r(∅) = 0 and r({{1, 2}}) = −1.
Then y{1,2},{{1,2}} = −1 is a PMAS for the (1-person) link game ({{1, 2}}, r). Suppose x
is a LMAS for ({1, 2}, r). Then it should hold that
x1,{{1,2}} ≥ x1,∅ = 0
x2,{{1,2}} ≥ x2,∅ = 0
x1,{{1,2}}+ x2,{{1,2}} = −1
.
Consequently, 0 ≤ x1,{{1,2}}+x2,{{1,2}} = −1, a contradiction. We conclude that ({1, 2}, r)
does not have a LMAS.
Remark 4.1 Note that the non-negativity of the PMAS in theorem 4.1 can be replaced
by the condition that r is non-negative.
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In Sprumont (1990) it is shown that every convex game has a PMAS. Using theorem
4.1 and remark 4.1 above the following corollary follows directly.
Corollary 4.1 Let (N, r) be a reward game. If the associated link game (L, r) is non-
negative and convex, then (N, r) has a LMAS.
Theorem 4.1 states that a reward game has a LMAS if the corresponding link game
has a non-negative PMAS. The following example illustrates that the LMAS-concept is
not just the equivalent for PMAS in link games associated with reward games. In this
example we present a reward game with a LMAS, although the associated link game
does not have a PMAS.
Example 4.2 Consider the ’glove game’ with player 1 having a left glove and player 2
and 3 both having a right glove. The value of a left glove or a right glove alone is zero.
The value of a pair of gloves, a left and a right glove, is one.
Computing the rewards that can be obtained for the various cooperation structures
results in the reward game (N, r) with5
r(L) =
 1 , if 12 ∈ L or 13 ∈ L0 , otherwise .
It is easily verified that the corresponding link game (L̄, r) does not have a PMAS since
such a PMAS should satisfy x12,{12} = x13,{13} = 1 implying x12,{12,13} + x13,{12,13} ≥ 2
which cannot hold since r({12, 13}) = 1. Note that this link game is not even balanced.
Now consider the following allocation scheme for the reward game (N, r).
yi,L =
 1 , if i = 1 and r(L) = 10 , otherwise .
It is easily checked that (yi,L)i∈N,L⊆L̄ is a link monotonic allocation scheme.
The example above illustrates that the class of reward games with a link monotonic
allocation scheme does not correspond to the class of reward games with a PMAS for
the corresponding link game. Sprumont (1990) showed that a cooperative game with a
PMAS has to be totally balanced. The example above shows that a reward game can
have a LMAS while the corresponding link game is not even balanced.
After the results above one might expect the class of reward games with a LMAS to be
a large class. However, we show in the following example that the class of reward games
with a LMAS does not contain all reward games with a totally balanced associated link
game.
5For notational convenience we will sometimes refer to a link {i, j} as ij.
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Example 4.3 Consider the reward game (N, r) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
r(L) =

2 , if L = L̄
1 , if L 6= L̄ and ∃i ∈ N such that L ⊃ KN\{i}
0 , otherwise
.
For the associated link game, y with y13 = y24 = 1 and y12 = y14 = y23 = y34 = 0 is
a core-element. For all subgames one can also find a core-element, e.g. for the subgame
on {12, 13, 14, 23, 24} we have that y with y with y12 = 1 and y13 = y14 = y23 = y24 = 0
is a core-element. Hence, (L̄, r) is totally balanced. We will show that (N, r) does not
have a LMAS.
Suppose x is a LMAS for (N, r). From xi,∅ = 0 for all i ∈ N it follows by monotonicity
of the allocation scheme that xi,L ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and all L ⊆ L̄. From x1,{12,13,23}+
x2,{12,13,23}+x3,{12,13,23} = 1, and
∑
i∈{1,2,3,4}xi,{12,13,14,23,24} = 1 it follows by monotonicity
that x4,{12,13,14,23,24} = 0 . By using monotonicity of the allocation scheme we conclude
that x4,{12,14,24} = 0.
Interchanging the role of players 1 and 4 we get x1,{12,14,24} = 0, while interchanging
the role of players 2 and 4 would result in x2,{12,14,24} = 0. So, x1,{12,14,24}+ x2,{12,14,24}+
x4,{12,14,24} = 0 which contradicts. x1,{12,14,24}+x2,{12,14,24}+x4,{12,14,24} = 1. We conclude
that (N, r) does not have a LMAS.
In the following we will describe the class of reward games with a LMAS. First, we
will introduce some definitions. Player i is called a veto-player in the reward game (N, r)
if cooperation of player i is required to obtain profits, i.e. r(L) = 0, for all L ⊆ KN\{i}.
A reward game is a reward game with veto-control if it is a reward game with at least
one veto-player. The reward game (N, r) is called a simple reward game if r(L) ∈ {0, 1}
for all L ⊆ L̄. Finally, recall that a reward game is monotonic if r(L1) ≤ r(L2) for all
L1 ⊆ L2.
Sprumont (1990) showed that a TU-game has a PMAS if and only if it is a positive
linear combination of monotonic simple games with veto-control. The following theorem
provides a similar result with respect to reward games with a LMAS.
Theorem 4.2 A reward game (N, r) has a LMAS if and only if it is a positive linear
combination of monotonic simple reward games with veto-control.
Proof: First assume (N, r) is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple reward
games with veto-control. If x1 is a LMAS for (N, r1) and x2 a LMAS for (N, r2) then
obviously αx1 + βx2 is a LMAS for (N,αr1 + βr2) if α, β ≥ 0, where (αr1 + βr2)(L) =
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αr1(L) +βr2(L) for all L ⊆ L̄. A monotonic simple reward game with veto-control has a
LMAS, which is easily seen by attributing the reward of any structure completely to one
specific veto-player. Since (N, r) is a positive linear combination of monotonic simple
reward games with veto-control it follows that (N, r) has a LMAS.
Now, assume (N, r) has a LMAS x = (xi,L)i∈N,L⊆L̄. Then we can write (N, r) as a
sum of monotonic reward games with veto-control (N, ri)i∈N , where r
i(L) = xi,L for all
i ∈ N and all L ⊆ L̄.
It remains to show that every monotonic reward game with veto-control can be written
as a positive linear combination of monotonic simple reward games with veto-control.
Let (N, ri) be a monotonic reward game with veto-player i. Define
K := |{z ∈ IR++ | ∃L ∈ L̄ : r
i(L) = z}|
and let t0 := ri. For k = 1, . . . , K define
αk := min{tk−1(L) | tk−1(L) > 0, L ⊆ L̄}
and










k, with αk > 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Since all (N, rik) are monotonic simple reward games with veto-player i it follows that
every monotonic reward game with veto-control can be written as a positive linear com-
bination of monotonic simple reward games with veto-control. 2
5 Convexity
In this section we will introduce two notions of convexity in the setting of reward games,
player convexity and link convexity. We will show that there is a relation between player
convexity and the allocation scheme based on the Myerson value being link monotonic.
Similarly, we will show that there is a relation between link convexity and the allocation
scheme based on the position value (cf. Borm et al. (1992)) being link monotonic.
In introducing a notion of convexity in the setting of reward games, we could simply
focus on convexity of the corresponding link game. However, in reward games we focus
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on the players and convexity of the associated link games focuses on the links. Therefore,
we will not consider convexity of the associated link game, but we will introduce two
different notions of convexity for the class of reward games.
First, recall that a cooperative game (N, v) is convex if for all S, T ⊆ N with S ⊆ T
and all i ∈ S
v(S)− v(S\{i}) ≤ v(T )− v(T\{i}).
Convexity states that the marginal contribution of a player does not decrease if this
player joins a larger coalition.
Translating the interpretation of convexity in cooperative games to reward games,
it seems natural to look at the total contribution of all links a player is involved in.
However, this can be interpreted in at least two different ways.
Definition 3 A reward game (N, r) is player convex if for all L1, L2 ⊆ L̄ with L1 ⊆ L2
and all i ∈ N
r(L1)− r(L1\L1i ) ≤ r(L
2)− r(L2\L2i ).
Definition 4 A reward game (N, r) is link convex if for all L1, L2 ⊆ L̄ with L1 ⊆ L2












A reward game is player convex if the marginal contribution of the set of all the links
a player is involved in does not decrease when the set of links is enlarged. A reward game
is link convex if the sum of the marginal contributions of the links a player is involved
in does not decrease when the set of links is enlarged.
These two notions of convexity will be used in analyzing two allocation rules defined
on the class of reward games. We will use convexity in describing the set of reward games
where a specific (extended) allocation rule is a link monotonic allocation scheme.
The first allocation rule is the Myerson value which was already described in section
3. The second allocation rule is the position value. Let (N, r) be a reward game with
unanimity coordinates (αA)A⊆L̄. Then the position value π(N, r, L) is defined by












, for all i ∈ N.
This position value is a natural extension of the position value for cooperative games,





where Φ denotes the Shapley value. Hence,





Φl(L, r|L), for all i ∈ N.
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We will characterize the two allocation rules above using potentials, similar to the
characterization of the Shapley value by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). The potential used
in the characterization of the Myerson value focuses on the total marginal contribution
of a player. The potential used in the characterization of the position value focuses on
the marginal contributions of the links.
Consider a function P that assigns to every reward communication situation (N, r, L)
a real number. The marginal contribution of a player can now be defined in two natural
ways. First as the total marginal contribution of all his links, i.e.
D1iP (N, r, L) := P (N, r, L)−P (N, r, L\Li), for all (N, r, L) ∈ RCS and all i ∈ N. (1)
Secondly, we can define the marginal contribution of a player as the sum of the marginal
contributions of the links this player is involved in, i.e.
D2iP (N, r, L) =
∑
l∈Li
[P (N, r, L)− P (N, r, L\{l})] for all (N, r, L) ∈ RCS and all i ∈ N.
(2)
A function P is called a player potential function if P (N, r, ∅) = 0 and
∑
i∈N
D1i P (N, r, L) = r(L), (3)
i.e the sum of the marginal contributions w.r.t D1 equals the value of the cooperation
structure.
A function P is called a link potential function if P (N, r, ∅) = 0 and
∑
i∈N
D2i P (N, r, L) = r(L), (4)
i.e the sum of the marginal contributions w.r.t D2 equals the value of the cooperation
structure.
The following theorem shows that there exists a unique player potential function and
for all reward games it holds that the marginal contributions coincide with the Myerson
value.
Theorem 5.1 There exists a unique player potential function P . For all reward com-
munication situations (N, r, L) ∈RSC it holds that D1iP (N, r, L) = µi(N, r, L) for all
i ∈ N .
Proof: First we show that there exists a player potential function and that the marginal
contributions of this player potential function coincide with the Myerson value.
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Let (N, r) be a reward game. Since a reward function is the characteristic function
of the associated link game, this function can be written as a unique linear combination
of unanimity games, i.e. r =
∑
A⊆L̄ αAuA. We define (P (N, r, L))L⊆L̄:





, for all L ⊆ L̄.
Obviously, P (N, r, ∅) = 0. Furthermore, for all L ⊆ L̄

















= µi(N, r, L) (5)
Since the Myerson value is efficient it follows that the sum of the marginal contribu-
tions equals the value of the cooperation structure.
Since the arguments above hold for all reward games (N, r) it holds that
(P (N, r, L))
(N,r,L)∈RSC is a player potential function.
It remains to show that the player potential function is unique. If Q is a player
potential function it follows by equations (1) and (3) that for all (N, r, L) with L 6= ∅
that










For all reward games (N, r) it holds that Q(N, r, ∅) = 0, so Q(N, r, L) can be deter-
mined recursively using this equation.6 This proves the uniqueness of the player potential
function.
This completes the proof. 2
Secondly, we consider D2. Recall that P is a link potential function if∑
i∈N D
2
i P (N, r, L) = r(L) for all (N, r, L) and P (N, r, ∅) = 0 for all (N, r). The follow-
ing theorem shows that there exists a unique link potential function and the marginal
contributions coincide with the position value.
6Note that for i ∈ N with Li = ∅ it holds that L\Li = L. So, equation (6) is not a recursive formula.
However, since L 6= ∅ there exists i ∈ N with Li 6= ∅, so equation (6) can be rewritten to show that
Q(N, v, L) is uniquely determined by {Q(N, r, A) | A ⊂ L}.
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Theorem 5.2 There exists a unique link potential function P . For all reward com-
munication situations (N, r, L) ∈RSC it holds that D2iP (N, r, L) = πi(N, r, L) for all
i ∈ N .
Proof: First we show that there exists a link potential function and that the marginal
contributions of the link potential function coincide with the position value.
Let (N, r) be a reward game. Recall that a reward function is the characteristic
function of the associated link game, which can be written as a unique linear combination
of unanimity games, i.e. r =
∑
A⊆L̄ αAuA. We define (P (N, r, L))L⊆L̄:





, for all L ⊆ L̄.
Obviously, P (N, r, ∅) = 0. Furthermore, for all L ⊆ L̄
D2iP (N, r, L) =
∑
l∈Li





















= πi(N, r, L) (7)
Finally, note that the position value is efficient which implies that the sum of the marginal
contributions equals the value of the cooperation structure. Since the arguments above
hold for all reward games (N, r) it holds that (P (N, r, L))
(N,r,L)∈RSC is a link potential
function.
It remains to show that the link potential function is unique. If Q is a link potential
function it follows by equations (2) and (4) that for all reward communication situations










2[Q(N, r, L)−Q(N, r, L\{l})].
Hence,







Since for all reward games Q(N, r, ∅) = 0 this determines Q(N, r, L) recursively. This
proves the uniqueness of the link potential function.
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This completes the proof. 2
In the remainder of this section we study allocation schemes resulting from the My-
erson value and the position value. We concentrate on the conditions on the underly-
ing reward game such that these allocation schemes are link monotonic. For a reward
game (N, r) we refer to (µi(N, r, L))i∈N, L⊆L̄ as the Myerson allocation scheme and to
(πi(N, r, L))i∈N, L⊆L̄ as the position allocation scheme. Furthermore, if P is the player
potential function then we refer to (N,P|(N,r)), where P|(N,r) is the restriction of P to
{(N, r, L)|L ⊆ L̄}, as the player potential reward game associated with (N, r). Similarly,
if P is the link potential function then we refer to (N,P|(N,r)) as the link potential reward
game associated with (N, r).
Maŕın-Solano and Rafels (1996) show that the allocation scheme based on the Shapley
value for a cooperative game is a population monotonic allocation scheme if and only if
the associated potential game is convex. We will find a similar result regarding reward
games, the Myerson value, and the position value.
The following theorem states that the Myerson allocation scheme is a link monotonic
allocation scheme if and only if the associated player potential reward game is player
convex.
Theorem 5.3 Let (N, r) be a reward game. The Myerson allocation scheme is a LMAS
if and only if the associated player potential reward game (N,P|(N,r)) is player convex.
Proof: For notational convenience we will write P instead of P|(N,r) and P (L) instead
of P|(N,r)(N, r, L).
Since the Myerson allocation scheme obviously satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of def-
inition 1 it suffices to show that the Myerson allocation scheme satisfies condition (iii)
if and only if the player potential reward game associated with (N, r) is player convex.
Denote the player potential reward game associated with (N, r) by (N,P ).
(N,P ) is player convex if and only if for all i ∈ N and all L1 ⊆ L2 ⊆ L̄
P (L1)− P (L1\L1i ) ≤ P (L
2)− P (L2\L2i ).
By (5) we find that this is equivalent to
µi(N, r, L
1) ≤ µi(N, r, L
2).
for all i ∈ N and all L1 ⊆ L2 ⊆ L̄ . This completes the proof. 2
16
The following theorem contains a similar result for the position value and a link convex
associated link potential reward game.
Theorem 5.4 Let (N, r) be a reward game. The position allocation scheme is a LMAS
if and only if the associated link potential reward game (N,P|(N,r)) is link convex.
Proof: For notational convenience we will write P in stead of P|(N,r) and P (L) instead
of P|(N,r)(N, r, L).
Since the position allocation scheme obviously satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of defi-
nition 1 it suffices to show that the position allocation scheme satisfies condition (iii) if
and only if the link potential reward game associated with (N, r) is link convex. Denote
the link potential game associated with (N, r) by (N,P ).
(N,P ) is link convex if and only if for all i ∈ N and all L1 ⊆ L2 ⊆ L̄:∑
l∈L1i
[






P (L2)− P (L2\{l})
]
.
By (7) we find that this holds if and only if
πi(N, r, L
1) ≤ πi(N, r, L
2),
for all i ∈ N and all L1 ⊆ L2 ⊆ L̄. This completes the proof. 2
6 Symmetric connections model
In this section we analyze a specific example, the symmetric connections model de-
scribed and analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Watts (1997). We start with
a description of this model. Subsequently, we analyze under what conditions a link
monotonic allocation scheme exists and relate these results to the conclusions of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). Finally, we show that in this model the Myerson allocation scheme
and the position allocation scheme will in general not be link monotonic.
The connections model represents social communication between individuals. Players
communicate with people they are connected with, however, the value of the communi-
cation between two players depends on the shortest path in the graph between these two
players. If we denote by tij(L) the length of the shortest path between i and j in the
graph (N,L), where tij(L) =∞ if i and j are not connected, then the utility of player i






where δ (0 < δ < 1) represents the idea that the value of communication between two
players decreases when the distance between the two players increases and c denotes the





The following theorem shows that in the symmetric connections model with at least
three players (ui(L))i∈N,L⊆L̄ is a link monotonic allocation scheme if and only if c ≤
δ− δ2. Additionally, we show that (N, r) possesses no link monotonic allocation scheme
if c > δ − δ2.
Theorem 6.1 The symmetric connections model with |N | ≥ 3 has a link monotonic
allocation scheme if and only if c ≤ δ − δ2. Moreover, if c ≤ δ − δ2 then (ui(L))i∈N,L⊆L̄
is a link monotonic allocation scheme.
Proof: First we will show that if c > δ − δ2 there exists no link monotonic allocation
scheme. Subsequently, we show that if c ≤ δ−δ2 then (ui(L))i∈N,L⊆L̄ is a link monotonic
allocation scheme.
Assume c > δ−δ2. The value of the complete graph is given by r(L̄) =
∑
{i,j}∈L̄[2δ−2c]
since all pairs of players are connected directly. Deleting one link, between players
1, 2 ∈ N reduces the costs by 2c and the profits by 2(δ−δ2) since the length of the shortest
path between players 1 and 2 increases from t12 = 1 to t12 = 2. Hence, r(L̄\{{1, 2}}) =∑
{i,j}∈N[2δ − 2c] + 2c − 2(δ − δ
2) > r(L̄) since c > δ − δ2. So, cooperation structure
(N, L̄\{{1, 2}}) has a larger value than the cooperation structure (N, L̄) which contains
one link more. This implies that (N, r) cannot have a link monotonic allocation scheme.
Now, assume c ≤ δ− δ2. It follows directly that (ui(L))i∈N,L⊆L̄ satisfies conditions (i)
and (ii) of definition 1 on page 6. It remains to show that it satisfies condition (iii). It
suffices to show that ui(L) ≤ ui(L∗) for all L,L∗ ⊆ L̄ with |L| = |L∗| − 1. Let i ∈ N ,
L ⊂ L̄, and {j, k} ∈ L̄\L. Denote L∗ = L∪{{j, k}}. Since adding a link can only reduce
the length of the shortest path between two players it holds that
trs(L) ≥ trs(L
∗) (8)
for all r, s ∈ N , which implies that for all r, s ∈ N
δtrs(L) ≤ δtrs(L
∗). (9)
We will distinguish two cases, (i) i ∈ {j, k} and (ii) i 6∈ {j, k}.
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where the second equality follows by rearranging the terms and |L∗i | = |Li| + 1. The
inequality follows by equation (8) and δtik(L
∗) − δtik(L) = δ − δtik(L) ≥ δ − δ2 ≥ c.






∗) − c|L∗i | ≥
∑
r 6=i
δtir(L) − c|Li| = ui(L),
where the inequality follows by equation (8) and |L∗i | = |Li|. 2
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) find that if c < δ − δ2 then the complete graph is the
unique pairwise stable network, i.e. there is no player that can strictly improve his
payoff by breaking a link he is involved in and there is no pair of players that can both
improve their payoffs by forming an additional link between them, where at least one
improvement should be strict. They do not consider the case c = δ− δ2. In this case the
corresponding LMAS improves the payoffs of the players that form a link, however, this
improvement need not be strict.
It is easily seen that if |N | = 2 there exists a LMAS if and only if δ ≥ c. In that
case both the Myerson allocation scheme and the position allocation scheme coincide
with (ui(L))i∈N,L⊆L̄, which is a LMAS. However, we will show that if |N | ≥ 3 then
the position allocation scheme and the Myerson allocation scheme are both not a link
monotonic allocation scheme in this model.
Theorem 6.2 In the symmetric connections model with |N | ≥ 3 both the extended
Myerson value and the position allocation scheme are not a LMAS.
Proof: The Myerson allocation scheme is not a LMAS since µ2(N, r, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}) =
2δ − 2c + 2
3
δ2 while µ2(N, r, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}}) = 2δ − 2c. Similarly, the position
allocation scheme is not a LMAS since π2(N, r, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}) = 2δ − 2c + δ2 while
π2(N, r, {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}}) = 2δ − 2c. 2
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